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political ventures and philosophy, with what the author believes
to have been the basis for each. There is no mention of his wife
in connection with any period of his life and only once is his son,
Phillip, mentioned, even though his associations with many
other persons who must have had infinitely less influence upon
him are remarked.
One is left with the feeling that in attempting to magnify
the political effect of the things he did, the author has somehow
not done justice to Willkie, the man.
Stuart D. Lunn*
A STUDY IN SEMANTIC ORIENTAby Anatol Rapoport. Harper & Brothers, New York,
1950. Pp. xxviii, 262. $3.50.

SCIENCE AND THE GOALS OF MAN:
TION,

When a law journal carries a review of a book published
three years ago, it perhaps behooves the reviewer to make some
explanation of the apparent tardiness. In reality, Dr. Rapoport's
book will continue to be timely so long as science remains an
"end to which human beings are to be made the means, rather
than the means to producing a race of free individuals."' His
work is significant because it indicates how the social scientistand the lawyer-may ultimately be able to make predictive judgments with reference to human affairs, with the detachment of
the astronomer who predicts an eclipse. With predictability as
the sole criterion of truth, the distinction between descriptive
and normative assertions will be eliminated.
Dr. Rapoport is admittedly in great debt to the late Alfred
Korzybski. At a time when the legal realists were beginning to
reveal the clay feet of Austinian jurisprudence, Korzybski published his general formulation for a metaphysics which would
remove the social sciences' onus of Aristotelianism. 2 While the
relatively small influence of Korzybski among social scientiststo say nothing of lawyers-may be chiefly due to a preference
for a simple absolutist faith, some of this lack of reception might
be because Korzybski's writings are hard to read, repetitious, and
often uninteresting.
It is for this reason that Dr. Rapoport has made such an
* Member, Shreveport Bar.

1. Huxley, Brave New World, foreword to 2 ed., 1946, p. 14.
2. Korzybski, Science and Sanity, 1 ed., 1933, 2 ed., 1941, 3 ed., 1948.
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important contribution to the social sciences. In a small book
of approximately two hundred fifty pages of text, he has outlined,
in an extremely lucid style, what has come to be known as "general semantics." For purposes of the study, he has divided the
book into three important aspects of being human: communication, orientation, and values. Communication, the traditional
concern of "semantics" as the term is narrowly used, is deftly
explained by the author's pointing out how human beings abstract from their environment, classify and symbolize their abstractions, transmit these symbols by means of language, and
almost invariably disagree because of defects in transmission.
With proper orientation, these imperfections of communication can be eradicated. The first step, in the social scientist's
reorientation is the elimination of the defects of his Aristotelian
heritage, namely, the habits of allness, 3 identification,4 and. twovalued orientation.5 After this catharsis he must develop a multivalued orientation, be careful to distinguish between levels of
abstraction, define his terms in such a way as to connect them
(not necessarily by the definition itself, but by a chain of definitions) to the levels of common experience, and use the only
criterion of truth: the criterion of predictability. While a complete reorientation to a non-Aristotelian language structure is
admittedly difficult, such a reorientation is, in the opinion of the
author (and also of the reviewer), as essential to any advance
in the social sciences as the theory of relativity was to the development of the atomic bomb.
But where does the non-Aristotelian get his values? Dr.
Rapoport points out that under a truly non-Aristotelian metaphysics, the scientist's only preference is for the "best available
map of reality." Beyond that, his values flow directly from the
scientific practice itself. The reader might then complain: "But
3. "... . the habit of identifying a thing with the class in which it has
been placed (by definition) or with a property described to it (by induction)."
Rapoport, p. 123.
4. ". . . confusing words or other symbols with the things they stand for."
Rapoport, p. 126.
5. ". . . 'either-or' (two-valued) orientation. Its source can be easily
traced to the second and third Aristotelian 'laws of thought.' (2) 'A is B'
and 'A is not B' cannot both be true assertions; (3) One of the assertions
'A is B' or 'A is not B' must be true." Rapoport, p. 130. Such an orientation
causes the lawyer to think in terms of dichotomies. Securities must be either
stocks or bonds, there must be either a contract or no contract, a tort or no
tort, decisions must be "sound" or "unsound," etc. Cf.: "No physicist will
derive much meaning from St. Thomas Acquinas' assertion that a thing is
either cold or hot. The physicist uses a thermometer." Rapoport, p. 131.
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I don't see how you can ever get an ought out of an is." The
difficulty with this statement is that it presupposes the Aristotelian distinction between normative and descriptive assertions.
The "is" of identity which Aristotelianism has inflicted upon us
must be completely obliterated, and the only "ought" in science
is the preference for the best map-the one that gives the greatest
predictability.
One of the most valuable things about Dr. Rapoport's work
is that it introduces the person who is not familiar with general
semantics to the field, by means of a very clearly written book
with illustrations that cannot help but drive the writer's points
home. For those who have some acquaintanceship with Korszybski's writings, much of what they have read will become infinitely
clearer to them. Above all, the reviewer feels that the lawyer
will be particularly helped by this book. To the extent that it
helps him get away from allness, identification, either-or orientation, elementalism,6 and absolutism, 7 he cannot help but improve
his ability to manipulate doctrine, regardless of what his goals
may be. This is to say nothing of the even more important development of an overall legal science having at least some of the
predictability of the physical sciences.
In a recent address at the University of Mississippi School of
Law, Dean Wesley Sturges of the Yale Law School stated that
the primary objective of legal education is to put the student in
a position where he will be able to make rational policy determinations. Of all the forms of education which have been developed in this country, he went on to say, our present system of
legal education, despite its flaws, is still the best yet devised for
the preparation of leaders for our twentieth century society.
The law teacher soon learns that no matter how hard he
tries to get at "the underlying policy considerations" of a particular set of doctrines, he invariably ends up with a reformulation
which has all the appearances of another doctrine. This is not to
say that such reformulations are of no value. Indeed, recasting
doctrine in policy oriented terms is of tremendous value in the
extirpation of the chaos of traditional positivist legal education.
6. ". . . a tendency to take seriously the divisions and dichotomies implied
by language, to believe in the existence of separate independent 'qualities' or
'categories,' simply because words have been invented to stand for them."
Rapoport, p. 132.
7. "Failure to recognize the intimate connection between the observer

and the observed may be called 'absolutism.'"

Rapoport, p. 141.
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The legal realists demonstrated that such a legal education is
inadequate to achieve the kind of predictability necessary for
man to order his own affairs. Their revolt against earlier doctrinaire systems of jurisprudence was quite successful insofar as
it exposed what now seems to be the rather obvious fact that the
jurist uses doctrine-that is, the "law" in the law books-as a
tool to reach results which he deems desirable for certain "policy"
reasons, which often remain unexpressed.
But from what source does he derive his "policy"? From the
9
"living law"?8 From the "natural law"? From a set of "values"
that can be said to be the ultimate desiderata of all members of
his society? From Leninist-Stalinist "fundamental principles"?
Or, perhaps from "Big Brother"?
To use Aristotelian terms, the content of legal realism was
descriptive, rather than normative. As a result, no attempt was
made to describe the source of the judge's "policy," other than
to say that it may have come from what he learned at his
mother's knee, from "common sense," or perhaps as a result of
forgetting his bicarbonate on the day of a particular decision.
In more recent times, there has been a greater attempt to
develop a structure that would not be merely critical of the law
in the law books, but would set up a framework for analysis of
the entire institution of law, and at the same time give this'institution a direction along policy-oriented lines.10 Before this very
laudable objective can be completely successful, however, the
legal scientist must first attain a completely non-Aristotelian
orientation. Dr. Rapoport's book will certainly get him off to a
right start.
Harold G. Wren*
8. See Northrop, Contemporary Jurisprudence and International Law, 61

Yale L.J. 623 (1952).
9. See Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 Yale L.J. 203 (1943); McDougal,
The Role of Law in World Politics, 20 Miss. L.J. 253 (1949); McDougal, Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value Clarification as an Instrument of Democratic World Order, 1 Am. J. Com. Law 24 (1952), 61 Yale L.J.

915 (1952).
10. Ibid.
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